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ABSTRACT
A methodology for modeling and evaluating measures of effectiveness of
C3 systems is described. The approach combines the framework provided by
the Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) and the
quantitative methods of the System Effectiveness Analysis approach. The
application to a C3 problem in which a test bed is used is outlined.
Finally, the question of credibility is addressed, when only data from test
beds and demonstrations are available for evaluating measures of
effectiveness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Improvements in weapon system technology, and higher capacity and
speed in data transmission, combined with an increasing complexity of the
battlefield, impose severe time constraints on hardware, software, and
human decisionmakers. The purpose of this paper is to present a
methodology that is being developed at MIT for modeling and computing
measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for C3
systems. The methodological framework was first applied to C3 systems by
Bouthonnier and Levis [1] and then extended in a series of theses and
papers: Cothier and Levis [2], Karam [3], Karam and Levis [4], Bohner [5],
and Martin [6].
In the last several years, a series of workshops have been held at the
Naval Postgraduate School in an effort to develop generic tools for
evaluating C3 systems and architectures [7]. The Modular Command and
Control Evaluation Structure, or MCES, provides a framework for evaluating
C3 architectures in which many different paradigms, models, and algorithmic
procedures can be embedded. In this paper, an effort is made to show how
the MCES framework and the quantitative System Effectiveness Analysis
approach can be integrated to provide a useful way for defining and
evaluating MOEs for C3 systems.
This integration has become possible because both approaches are based
on the same six concepts: system, environment, context, parameters,
measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness. The first three
are used to pose the problem, while the last three define the key
quantities in the analytical formulation of the problem. The analytical
aspects of the methodology mainly address how hardware characteristics,
system structure, and standard operating procedures related to system
performance.
The system consists of components, their interconnections, and a set
of operating procedures. A boundary can be drawn that defines what is
included within the system whose effectiveness is to be assessed; what is
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included depends on the analysis at hand. The environment consists of our
own forces and the adversary's forces, upon which our forces can act and
which can act upon ours. For example, a C3 system is used to monitor
(sense) the environment and to direct forces. Engagements between two
forces in an urban area or at a mountain pass define typical environments.
The context denotes the set of conditions and assumptions within which the
system and the environment exist. The relationship between system,
environment, and context is shown in Figure 1.
ENVIRONMENT (E)
SYSTEM (S)
CONTEXT (C)
Figure 1. System, Environment, and Context
Parameters are the independent quantities used to specify the system and
the mission requirements. For example, in the case of a fire support
system, system parameters may include quantities that describe the
detection equipment, computational time delays, kill radius of the
munition, and failure probabilities associated with the components, to name
but a few. Parameters of the mission may be the tempo of operations, as
described by the speed of the threats, and the size of the engagement.
Measures of Performance are quantities that describe system properties or
mission requirements. MOPs for a command and control system may include
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reliability, survivability, cost, and probability of kill. The mission
requirements should be expressed by the same quantities as the system MOPs,
e.g., minimum reliability or survivability, maximum cost, or minimum
probability of kill. System parameters are defined within the system
boundary; MOPs may be defined within the boundary, or they may include
aspects of the environment.
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are quantities that result from the
comparison of the system MOPs to the mission requirements. They reflect
the extent to which the system meets the requirements. To evaluate the
MOEs, it is necessary to go outside the boundary and consider the
environment. Only then could the effect of the system on the mission
outcome be evaluated.
In this methodology for assessing effectiveness, the system MOPs and
the mission requirements must be modeled and analyzed independently, but in
a common context. The system capabilities should be determined
independently of the mission requirements, and the mission requirements
should be derived without considering the system to be assessed.
Developing requirements with a specific system implementation in mind leads
to obvious problems regarding the credibility of the assessment.
The analytical formulation of the methodology for system effectiveness
analysis (SEA) and its relationship to the Modular Command and Control
Evaluation Structure (MCES) are described in Section 2, while a recent
application to a problem is described briefly in Section 3. Finally, in
Section 4 some general consideration on measures of effectiveness are
presented.
2. THE TWO APPROACHES: MCES AND SEA
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) is shown
in Figure 2. It consists of seven modules organized in a sequential
manner. In reality, an analyst employing MCES would iterate between the
modules, as appropriate, until a satisfactory solution to the problem was
obtained.
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Figure 2. Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES)
In the first module, the decisionmaker's requirements are expressed in
the form of a problem statement consisting of a set of objectives and the
associated assumptions. In the second module, the problem statement is
used to bound the problem, i.e., specify the boundaries of the system to be
analyzed. This is the most critical part of the MCES methodology and the
one that often requires a number of iterations. The result is the
Is~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--------
identification of the system components and their interconnections. In the
third module, the particular command and control process is described. The
result is the specification of the set of functions such as nsense",
"assess", "generate", "select", and "direct" [8]. The allocation of the
functions derived in module 3 to the components and structure is carried
out in module 4. Thus, in the first four steps, the complete formulation
of the problem is achieved.
The next three modules constitute the "solution" to the problem. In
module 5, the various measures that are relevant for the problem in
question are specified: MOPs, MOEs and, if appropriate, Measures of Force
Effectiveness or MOFEs. Such measures as survivability, reliability, and
interoperability are typical examples of MOPs. However, these measures
represent general concepts; there is need for problem-specific variables
that are measurable and can represent these MOPs, i.e., instantiations for
the specific C 3 system being evaluated. The values of these variables
should be computable from data generated by the system. Finally, in module
7, the aggregation of MOEs is carried out.
The MCES methodology, as described briefly above, provides a logical
and orderly structure that guides the analyst through the process of
formulating the measures of effectiveness that are appropriate for the
problem in question. The System Effectiveness Analysis, (SEA) however,
focuses on the quantitative aspects of obtaining and evaluating measures of
effectiveness. Indeed, the steps of the SEA can be embedded in MCES and
especially in the last three modules.
The first step in (SEA) consists of defining the System, the
Environment, and the Context, followed by the selection of the parameters
that influence the system MOPs. By definition, these parameters are
considered mutually independent, since they constitute the "independent
variables" in the analytical formulation of the methodology. This step is
a specifc implementation of Modules 1 to 4 in MCES.
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In the second step, the analogous procedure is carried out for the
mission. Parameters of the mission are defined that are consistent with
the environment and the context. This step does not have a direct
correspondence to the modules of MCES, but is implicit in the feedback loop
between the aggregation modules and the decisionmaker (Fig. 2).
The third step consists of defining MOPs for the system that
characterize the properties that are of interest in the analysis. The MOPs
are expressed as functions of the parameters. The values of the MOPs could
be obtained from the evaluation of a function, from a model, from a
computer simulation, from a test bed, or from empirical data. Each MOP
depends, in general, on a subset of the parameters, i.e.,
MOPi = fi(xi.. .,k). (1)
MOPs may or may not be independent from each other: two measures are
interdependent, if they have parameters in common. A system realization
results in the set of parameters taking specific values {xi}. Substitution
of these values in the relationships (1) yields values for the set {MOP}.
Thus, any specific realization can be depicted by a point in the MOP space.
The fourth step consists of selecting the models that map the mission
parameters yi into the requirements:
Rm =fm(y,...,yn). (2)
Some of the mission requirements may be interrelated through dependence on
common parameters. It is also possible to introduce directly some
constraints between the requirements, e.g., a trade-off relationship
between delay and accuracy. However, it is preferable that such trade-off
relationships be derived through the functions or models that define MOPs
or requirements in terms of the mission parameters. Specification of
values for the mission parameters results in a point or region in the
mission requirements space.
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The two spaces, the system MOP space and the mission requirements
space, although of the same dimension, may be defined in terms of different
quantities, or quantities scaled differently. Therefore, the fifth step
consists of transforming the system measures and mission requirements into
a set of commensurate attributes defined on a common attribute space. For
example, one of the system MOPs may be vulnerability, while the
corresponding mission requirement may be survivability. Since they both
reflect the same concept - the effect of external actions - one of them may
be chosen as the common attribute, say, survivability, while the other one
will then be mapped into the first one.
The Measures of Performance for the system are functions of the system
parameters. Consequently, as the x's in Eq. (1) vary over their allowable
ranges, the MOPs take values that generate a locus in the MOP space. This
transformation is shown in Figure 3. The resulting locus is called the
System Locus, L5.
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Figure 3. System Locus
Analogously, the set of values that satisfy the mission requirements,
Eq. (2), constitute the Mission Locus, Lm (Fig. 4). The two loci are
constructed in step 6, after the common MOP space has been defined in step
5.
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The seventh step is the key one in analyzing the effectiveness of a C 3
system in view of the mission that is to be carried out. It consists of
procedures for comparing the system's MOPs and mission's requirements
through the geometric properties of two loci. The geometric relationship
between the two loci can take one of three forms:
(1) The two loci do not have any points in common, i.e., the intersection
of Ls and Lm is null:
L slL = 0. (3)s m
In this case, the system does not satisfy the mission's requirements, and
one would define the effectiveness to be zero, regardless of which specific
measure is used.
(2) The two loci have points in common, but neither locus is included in
the other:
L Lm A 0. (4)
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and
L n L < L and L. (5)
s m s m
In this case, a subset of the values that the MOPs may take satisfies the
mission requirements. Many different measures can be used to described the
extent to which the system meets the requirements. Each of these measures
may be considered an MOE. For example, let V be such a measure. Then an
effectiveness measure can be defined by
E1= V(L n Lm)/V(L) (6)
which emphasizes how well the system capabilities are used in the mission,
while
E = V(L n L )/V(L ) (7)
2 s m m
expresses the degree of coverage of the requirements by the system
capabilities.
(3) The mission locus is included in the system locus:
L nL =L . (8)
s m m
In this case, it follows from (8) that Ls is larger then Lm and,
consequently, the ratio defined by (6) will be less than unity. This
result can be interpreted in two ways. First, only certain system
attribute values meet the requirements of the mission. The second
interpretation is that the use of this system for the given mission
represents an inefficient use of resources since the system capabilities
exceed the mission requirements. Inefficiency, in turn, implies lower
effectiveness.
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The measures of effectiveness given by (6) or (8) are partial
measures. Let these partial measures be denoted by {Er}. To combine these
into a single global measure, utility theory may be used. Therefore, the
subjective judgements of the system designers and the users can be
incorporatred directly into the methodology in two ways: (1) by choosing
different partial measures, and (2) by selecting a utility function. The
global effectiveness measure is obtained, finally, from
E = u(E1,E 2.... ,Ek). (9)
This is the last step of the SEA methodology and corresponds to the seventh
module of the MCES.
3. EFFECTIVENESS OF AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM*
In the 1970's, the problem of aircraft identification in the NATO
environment was investigated and the implication of indirect or third party
ID was explored. Indeed, because of the speed of the threats and the short
reaction time available, indirect ID for distinguishing friends, foes, and
neutrals (IFFN) becomes crucial.
To assess the effectiveness of the indirect ID process, a test bed was
developed in order "to assess baseline capabilities within the air defense
C2 structure to perform the IFFN function, to identify deficiencies in the
performance of that function, and to define potential near-term procedural
and equipment modifications for further testing". This test bed [9] is a
surrogate for the actual system which, of course, can hardly be tested. By
conducting experiments on the IFFN Joint Test and Evaluation facilities, it
is expected that the effectiveness of the actual system can be assessed.
*This section is based on the recent thesis by Philippe J. F. Martin [6].
11
The IFFN System considered is shown in Figure 5; it is composed of
nodes corresponding to Fire Direction Centers (FDC), Control Reporting
Centers (CRC), Special Information System (SIS) and the weapons systems
(Patriot, Hawk, F-15, F-16).
SIS CRC NE-3A
Mixed
F 15 F 16
BDE FDC
Patriot Patriot Hawk
BN FDC BN BN FDC
Patriot Patriot Hawk Hawk
Figure 5. Structure of the Actual IFFN System
The mission of the system is to engage and destroy hostile airborne
targets and, therefore, deny the enemy access to the defended airspace and
to prevent attacks on friendly assets. At the same time, the system must
prevent attacks on friendly or neutral aircraft. To accomplish this
mission, the air defense system must perform a number of functions:
detection, tracking, identification, allocation, engagement, and target
kill.
As a first order approximation to the actual problem, a simplified
model was introduced (6] for which five system parameters were defined:
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(1) time needed to transmit information from one node to another (it
depends on whether the SIS is included or not);
(2) range from aircraft to the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) at
the time of detection; it depends on the variable Air Control
Procedure.
(3) quality of identification;
(4) level of centralization of control; and
(5) quality of target allocation and engagement. This is dependent on the
quality of the Q and A IFF devices.
The MOPs for assessing the system should have clear physical meaning
-- that helps in defining variables for measuring them -- and reflect the
tasks to be performed. Three MOPs have been defined.
The first MOP reflects the success of the air defense task; it is
measured by the normalized ratios of the remaining friendly forces to the
remaining enemy forces. The second MOP measures the number of neutrals
shot down by the air-defense system. The last MOP is the distance from the
FSCL that the enemy has achieved when the air battle ends.
When the five parameters are allowed to vary over their admissible
ranges, i.e.,
Pi,min i i,max
then the complete system locus is obtained. The plots of the locus have
been generated by a special purpose graphics package [51 for an IBM PC/AT
and an HP 7475 plotter. In Figures 6 and 7, the two dimensional
projections of the locus Ls are shown.
The mission requirements have been assumed to be the following: that
the friendly forces "win" the battle, that a small percentage of neutrals
is engaged, and that the enemy forces have not been allowed to come within
range of friendly assets on the ground. These conditions define a
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rectangular parallilepiped in the MOP space (Figure 8).
Mission locus
MOP2 MOP
* MOP1 l MOPI1
Figure 8. Projections of the Mission Locus
The appropriate measure of effectiveness is the one given by Eq. (6).
For the hypothetical values used in this example, E. was calculated to be
approximately 0.3. The actual value is not significant; what is
significant is that the methodology makes it possible to compute changes in
the value when functions or nodes are eliminated from (or added to) the
system [6].
4. CONCLUSION
In the previous three sections, a quantitative methodology for
assessing C3 systems was described and an illustrative example outlined.
The methodology was imbedded in the MCES which provides a framework for
formulating C3 system evaluation problems. The use of the IFFN test bed as
the illustrative example raises, however, a new class of Cs issues that are
relevant for large scale systems that are not easily tested in the field
under realistic operational conditions. The most prominent of these issues
is one of credibility: how credible are the results obtained from models,
simulations, and test beds with respect to the actual system's performance.
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A usual approach to the problem is to increase the fidelity of the
components in the expectation that the test bed will be a "credible"
surrogate for the real system. However, increased fidelity leads to
increased complexity and, hence, reduction in the transparency of the
results.
In considering the role of models and test beds in the assessment of
C3 systems, three functional groups can be identified: (a) the modeler, or
test bed builder, who conceives, designs, and implements the test bed; (b)
the user who is concerned with obtaining quantitative and qualitative
information; and (c) the decisionmaker, who requires pertinent, timely
analyses and recommendations from his staff.
If the identification of the three functional groups is accepted, then
the issues of validity, verification, and credibility can be put in
perspective.
Verification is a test of whether the model or test bed behaves exactly as
its designer intended.
Validation is a test of whether the model or test bed behavior is in
agreement with the real system it represents with respect to the specific
purposes for which the model has been designed.
Verification includes testing software, testing algorithms for
convergence, checking that data are entered properly and used correctly
and, generally, ensuring that the implemented model is true to its
conception and error free. Verification does not address the question of
whether the conception is valid.
Validation is an issue between the model user and the modeler because
validity is closely tied to the function the model will perform. A model
may be "valid" for one set of uses and invalid for many others that appear
to be very similar. While the differences may seem minor, they may violate
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some of the implicit assumptions in the model.
What is important in considering a "verifiedn model for use in
assessment is whether its underlying assumptions and theories, or the
approximations regarding the model's boundaries and the interactions
between the subsystems, are compatible with the issue to be analyzed. Even
though a model may have been verified by the modeler and considered valid
by the model user for a specific study, there is still a third issue:
credibility of the model with decision makers [10]. G. L. Johnson has
stated that 'problem solving analyses are credible with decision makers, if
they pass four tests: (1) coherence, (2) correspondence, (3) clarity, (4)
workability ' [11]. The first two, coherence and correspondence, can be
interpreted as tests for validation and verification, while the clarity
test is one of understandability. "When the decision maker applies the
test of workability, he checks the proposed solution and projected
consequence of the solution to see if he thinks the outcomes would actually
result from the prescribed action and, if they result, whether they will
solve the problem before him' [11]. A fifth test can be added for evolving
systems, that of repeatability, which measures the consistency over time
with which a model generates understandable and workable results.
This concept of credibility, with its attendant objective and
subjective tests, forms interactive links between the three entities - the
modeler, the user, and the decisionmaker.
In view of the expected increase in the use of test beds and
demonstrations, credibility may well become a dominant measure of
effectiveness in the future. Unfortunately, there are hardly any
procedures or tools for assessing credibility. Both conceptual and
analytical work is needed to address this issue.
17
5. REFERENCES
[1] V. Bouthonnier and A. H. Levis, "Effectiveness Analysis of C3 Systems,
IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-14, No. 1, Jan.
1984.
[2] P. H. Cothier and A. H. Levis, "Timeliness and Measures of
Effectiveness in Command and Control" IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-16, No. 6, Nov. 1986.
[3] J. G. Karam, "Effectiveness Analysis of Evolving Systems," MS Thesis,
LIDS-TH-1431, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, MIT,
Cambridge, MA, 1985.
[4] J. G. Karam and A. H. Levis, "Effectiveness Assessment of the METANET
Demonstration," Proc. 7th MIT/ONR Workshop on C3 Systems, LIDS-R-1437,
Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, MIT, Cambridge, MA,
Dec. 1985.
[5] C. M. Bohner, "Computer Graphics for System Effectiveness Analysis,"
SM Thesis, LIDS-TH-1573, Laboratory for Information and Decision
Systems, MIT, Cambridge, MA, June 1986.
[6] P.J.F. Martin, "Large Scale C3 Systems: Experiment Design and System
Improvement," SM Thesis, LIDS-TH-1580, Laboratory for Information and
Decision Systems, MIT, Cambridge, MA, August 1986.
[7] R. Sweet, M. Metersky, and M. Sovereign, "Command and Control
Evaluation Workshop," Military Operations Research Society, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Jan 1985 (Rev. June 1986).
[8] R. Sweet, "An Evolving C2 Evaluation Tool - MCES Theory," Proc. 9th
MIT/ONR Workshop on C3 Systems, Laboratory for Information and
Decision Systems, MIT, Cambridge, MA (to appear December 1986).
[9] IFFN Test Plan, Air Force Army Joint Test Force, November 1985.
[10] S. Kahne, "Model Credibility for Large Scale Systems," IEEE Trans. on
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-7, August 1977.
[11] G. L. Johnson, "Opportunities for Systems Scientists in Modeling
Agricultural Systems," in System Theory Applications to Agricultural
Modeling, A. H. Levis, and C. L. Quance, Eds., Report ESCS-07, USDA,
February 1978.
18
